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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
1\'IILDRED D. DUBOIS, 
P lainti ff-Respondent, 
vs. 
F. RAY DUlJOIS, JH., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12820 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEl\J:F~NT OF J'ACTS 
Hespornle11t's Statement of I~,acts is unacceptable 
in se,·eral particulars. First, respondent has insisted on 
helahori11g the point that she had grounds for divorce 
something which was conceded at trial by appellant (R. 
13:3) *, ancl which is not, in fact, at issue in anyway in 
this appeal. Respondent's obsession with the question of 
fault does, howe,·er, reinforce appellant's argument, in 
Point V of his brief', that the trial court's award, when 
viewed as a whole, manifests an intent on the court's part 
to unlawfully punish appellant. 
*Note: R refers to the pagination of the Record. 
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Secondly, respondent's statement of facts deals at 
some length with her exhibits 2-P and 3-P, the intro-
cluetion of which into e''idence was objected to by a1} 
pellant on the ground that they were base<l upon re-
spondent's theory that the husband is the Trustee of the 
marital estate. (R. 99, 111-112, and 123). l\Ioreover, 
respondent admitted at that time that these exhibits 
were based upon that theory and that that was the theory 
upon which she was proceeding. (R. 111-114). Appel· 
lant, however, in Point II of his brief clearly establishes 
that this theory is repugnant to Utah law and respondent 
does not appear to contest this fact in her brief. In view 
of this, respondent's continued reliance upon these ex· 
hibits is strange indeed. 
Finally, respondent, in her statement of facts, ad· 
mits that appellant contributed in excess of $500.000.00 
hy way of earned income to the marital estate. She then 
proceeds to take this minimum figure as the absolute 
total of appellant's income, and, having divided it by 
the twenty-nine years of the parties' marriage, states 
that this amounts to only an average of $17,241.00 per 
year. Hespondent goes on to assert that it would have 
been impossible on such an income for appellant to build 
a marital estate with a value in excess of $570,000.00 
without the gifts to respondent from her family. 'Vhat 
respondent neglects to mention is that her family's gifts 
to her over the twenty-nine years in question totalled 
only $117,509.00, which amounts to only an average 
co;tribution per year of $4,052.03. \Ve submit that it 
3 
woulcl haYe been patently impossible for the parties to 
haYe accumulated a marital estate with a vlaue in excess 
of *570,000.00 but for appellant's contribution of earned 
income to the marital estate of over $17,241.00 per year. 
The following Argument is in the same order as 
the Argument in the briefs that have already been sub-
mitted in this matter. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
Contrary to respondent's assertions, this Court in 
MacDonald v. 1ll acDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 
( 1951) clearly held that it was proper for the trial court 
to take into consideration in adjusting the parties' prop-
erty rights both the inheritance which the wife had re-
ceived from her father subsequent to the development 
of the marital difficulties between the parties but prior 
to the initiation of the divorce proceedings, and the ex-
pectancy which she had in the estate of her sick, aged 
mother. 120 Utah at 578 and 582-83. The parties in the 
M ad)onald case had been married for twenty-nine years 
at the time of the divorce. During the course of their 
marriage the wife had developed a significant drinking 
problem. Finally the husband sued for divorce claim-. ' 
ing as grounds therefore that his wife had been habitual-
ly drunk for the preceding four years. At trial, the 
court so found, and awarded the divorce to the husband. 
'rhe court, however, awarded the wife almost all of the 
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property in the marital estate, plus attorney's fees and 
$10.00 per year alimony. l~O Utah at 576-77. The wife 
appealed claiming that the Court had committed re-
versible error by not awarding her substantial alimony, 
120 Utah at ;378. In the Supreme Courfs view, this was, 
"one of those cases where the marriage had so 
far deterioratecl that there was nothing ... to 
do except to recognize the failure . . . 'pro-
nounce a benediction on the wreck'; [and] pro-
ceed to make the best arrangement of the 
property and income of the parties so that they 
could reaclj ust their lives to the new situation 
as well as possible." 120 Utah at 577. 
The Court then noted that, 
"The assets posse~secl hy the parties were as 
follows: Their home, valued at $1:3,000, less 
a $6,000 mortgage, net value $7,000; house-
hold furniture and equipment valued at $2,000; 
1949 Hudson automobile value at $1,400, less 
a lien of $121; a bank account of $6,948.25 in 
defendant'.-; name-u:.:hich 'UHtS the balance of 
an inheritance of $8,000 u:hich she had rcceil'cd 
in 19;30. Def end ant also has an e,rpectancy in 
the estate of her mother who was 82 year.r; of 
age at the time of the trial. The plaintiff has 
been employed by the Chicago, l\Iilwaukce, St. 
Paul & Pacific Railroad Company at a good 
salary for many years; he is at present general 
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agent for the company at Salt Lake City at 
a gross salary of $481.80 per month, or a net 
of $1387.IJG after all deductions." 120 Utah at 
578. (Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court af firmcd the trial court's 
award of almost all of these rather modest assets to the 
wife. The Court's primary concern in this regard was 
the fact that the ";ife, although responsible for the di-
vorce, was unable, due to her alcoholism, to secure and 
hold a paying job, a fact which was conceded to be true 
by all parties to the action. 120 Utah at 580. 
The Court then considered the wife's claim that 
the rather modest assets awarded her by the trial court 
were insufficient to properly maintain her and that she 
was entitled, in addition, to a substantial alimony award. 
ln the Court's view the proper method to follow in this 
eotmection was to evaluate the facts of the case before 
it in the light of the fifteen points set forth by Chief 
J usticc \ Volfe in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P .2d 
2G;J ( 19137). Point nine of these fifteen points inquires 
into how the parties acquired the property contamed in 
the marital estate. The Court answered this point by 
noting that all of the property had been acquired via 
the husband's efforts except for three hundred dollars 
($aoo.oo) which she had put into the house and the six 
thousand nine hundred dollars ( $6,900.00) which she 
inherited from her father. 120 Utah at 581. The Court 
later summarized the importance of this factor in de-
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temining whether the wife should receive alimony as 
follows: 
"The court awar<le<l her much the larger share 
of the family assets, and in view of the fact 
that she had $G,900 in cash immediately avail-
able, saw no necessity to decree that she be pai<l 
substantial alimony immediately. True, this 
cash is hers, but it 'leas properly tali:en into ac-
1 • u111t in appraising the entire financial situ.a-
l 11111 of' the parties and adjusting their property 
rights." (Emphasis added) 120 Utah at 582. 
Point fourteen of the fifteen points set forth in 
the Pinion decision asks if there was, "[a]ny extra· 
ordinary sacrifice, devotion or care ·which may have been 
given to the spouse or others ... and obligations to 
other dependents having a secondary right to support." 
120 Utah at 582. The Court answered this bv stating 
that, 
"This factor is not important here, hut the 
converse of it is, She should not be required to 
look at her mother for support but the definite 
c,rpectaucy in her 82 year old mother's estate is 
something 'lohich 11W/J well be kept in rnind as 
a future conti11gc11clJ." (Emphasis added) 120 
Utah at 582. 
The Court thus clearly and unequivocally held that an 
important factor that must be considered by the tiial 
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court m order to accomplish a fair and equitable divi-
sion of the property in the marital estate is the existence 
of contingent future interests that may redound to the 
benefit of one of the parties. In the instant case, the 
e\'i(lence indicates that respondent will be the sole bene-
ficiary of her sick and aged mother's estate, the value 
of which was estimated at trial to be between One Hun-
dred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) and Two 
Hull<lrecl Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00). The trial 
eomt did not, however, in either its memorandum opin-
ion or its l<'irnlings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
mention or even allude to respondent's expectancy in 
her mother's estate. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the 
trial comt specifically awarded respondent the entire 
inheritance which she received from Dr. Hirth. In view 
of these facts and the size of the marital estate ( ap-
proximately $;j70,000.00) and the sources of the prop-
erty contained therein (over $500,000.00 in earned in-
come from appellant versus approximately $117,000.00 
which respondent receiYed in gifts from her family), it 
is cr~·stal clear that the trial court committed reyersible 
error and grossly abused its discretion by awarding re-
spondent sixty percent of the marital estate. 
Respornlent has attempted to distinguish llfichelsen 
Z'. Jlicliclsc11, 14 Utah 2d 328, 383 P.2d 893 (1963), 
which was cited in appellant's brief as being in accord 
with the Court's decision in l.llacDonald, by noting 
simply, as the Supreme Court did, in its opinion, that 
the trial court had "discussed" the inheritance which 
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the wife had received from her father in its second mem-
orandum decision. The fact the Court clismisse<l the 
husband's assertions on that ground, clearly supports 
appellant's contention that inheritances that vest in a 
party prior to the divorce must be considered by the 
trial court when it adjusts the financial affairs of the 
parties. The fact that the Court did not disturb the trial 
court's award in that case does not in any way lend sup· 
port to respondent's position for, unlike the jnstant case, 
the total assets contained in the marital estate, includ-
ing the wife's inheritance, amounted to only $70,000.00. 
Considering the wife's age, her lack of employment and 
the si,.;e of the marital estate it does not seem surprising 
that the Court affirmed the division of the assets and 
the $275.00 per month in alimony decreed by the trial 
court. 
Respondent has attempted to distin~111ish 1Voolley 
t'. 1Voollcy, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948), which 
held that the spouse in that case should he allowed to 
participate in any appreciation which might occur in 
some speculative mining properties which the trial comt 
had awarded to the husband, by stating that the case 
did not i1wolve an inheritance, vested or otherwise. That 
is true, hut the case does stand for the proposition that 
future contingencies must be considered by the trial 
court in its adjustment of the financial affairs of the 
parties, the very point that is in issue in the instant case. 
Finally, respondent claims that the 111 acDonalil 
case cannot mean what it clearly says for if it does it 
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"wo11 lcl balloon the whole discord of the marital rela-
tionship out of any semblance of perspective." (Re-
spornle11t's hrief at page 17). Respondent's adoption 
of this "horrible consequences" argument is interesting 
in three respects. First, it is a specious argument in that 
the holding in 1llacD011ald is clearly limited by the facts 
of that case to situations where a significant sum of 
money will devolve upon a party in the not too distant 
future by the occurrence of an unavoidable event. Sec-
onclly, respondent argues that such a rule would force 
the parties to engage in interminable and exhaustive 
discovery. This hardly seems likely, however, since it 
must he remembered that the parties to a divorce action 
hwe heen rnarriecl for some period of time and are in 
all probability quite familiar with the financial affairs 
of their spouse's family. :l\loreover, even if some slight 
inereasc in discovery is required, and the Utah cases as 
well as the cases from other jurisdictions (see appel-
lant's hrief at pages 6-7) that employ this rule do not 
reflect any such increase, this seems a small price to 
pay for a more equitable resolution of the partie-,' finan-
cial af f'airs. Finally, it must be noted that respondent's 
adherence to this ar6rument is particularly interesting 
in view of her apparent obsession both at trial and on 
appeal with the question of fault, something that was 
conceclecl at trial and which is not at issue on this appeal, 
for it clearly appears that respondent has attempted 
IO 
to "balloon" this issue "out of any semblance of per-
spective." As the Court in 11[ aclJonald noted: 
"Great caution is necessary to prevent the con-
tentions and strife which frequently exist in 
contested divorce cases from distorting the 
judgment by placing extraordinary emphasis 
on particular instances of blameworthy conduct 
or some unusual sacrifice or contribtuion in 
some one phase of the over-all picture.'' 120 
Utah at 580. 
POINT II 
Respondent has asserted in her brief that the trial 
court in chambers and off the record rejected her "trust" 
theory of the marital estate. The universally recognized 
rule is that the record which is certified to the appellate 
court controls that court's determination of the issues 
presented in the appeal. 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error § 48(). The application of this rule to the instant 
case would appear to be particularly appropriate because 
it is manifestly clear from a review of the record before 
the Court (see particularly R. 35-36, 99, 111-113 and 
123) and the trial court's award, that the triaJ court 
based its division of the marital estate upon respondent's 
trust theory. 
I~'inally, respondent has attempted to distinguish 
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A 11dcr.w11 v. A ndcrson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 
( HHi7), from the facts of the case at bar. A comparison 
of the facts of that case with the facts in the instant 
case reveals, however, that the trust theory that re-
spornlent proffered at trial (see R. 111-114) is identi-
eal in all material respects with the theory that the Su-
preme Court of Utah unequivocally rejected in the 
A ndcr.~on case. Since, as indicated above, the record re-
veals that the trial court adopted the theory in question 
as the basis of its division of the marital estate, it is 
dear that the trial court committed reversible error. 
POINT III 
Respondent in her statement of facts states that 
appella11t's annual salary at the time of his termination 
from Lee's was $22,000.00 per year and that his av-
erage income over the course of the parties' marriage 
was only $17,241.00 per year. As noted in appellant's 
hrief, respornlent's total assets of $422,044.00, composed 
of the $:J47,044<.00 awarded her out of the marital estate 
an<l the $75,000.00 she received from Dr. Hirth, which 
the court awarded her as her separate property, should 
produce approximately $30,000.00 per year in income 
if invested at an average annual return of seven per 
cent. In view of these facts, it is difficult to see how 
respondent can in good faith and good conscience argue 
that in addition to this investment income of $30,000.00 
per year she is entitled to alimony of four thousand five 
hundred dollars $4500.00) per year. This would seem 
pa1ticnlarly true in view of the fact that respondent 
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apparcntl~· docs not deny that an alimony awar<l 
"measure(! by the wife's reasonable needs and requir 
men ts considering her condition arnl station in Ii fe ... 
"Opens/um: t'. Opc11slta1c, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364, Ile 
( 1932). Consequently, it is clear from the absence c 
any e\·idence in the record as to what respondent's nee( 
are, that the trial court's award of alimony to responder 
was manifestly unjust, inequitable and unwarrante 
both by the facts arnl the equities of this case. 
POINT IV 
Contrary to respondent's assertions m her brieJ 
Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681 
()87 (1951) an(l JVciss 1:'. JVciss, 111 Utah !3;3:l, 361136 
and 364 17f> P.2d 1005 ( 1945) clearly and plainly hol1 
that "necessity" is the primary criterion by which th 
trial court must he guided in making an award of at 
torney fees. The four cases cited hy respondent in sup 
port of her position do not hold otherwise and each o 
them is in fact irrelevant to the issue raised on this ap 
peal. In Gardner 1:'. Gardner, 118 Utah 4!_)(3, 222 P.2( 
l 055 ( 1950), for example, the trial court awarded th1 
wife $150.00 in attorney's fees. The husband appeale1 
claiming solely that the court was precluded from mak 
irw such an award because his former wife had failed tc 
b 
specifieally ask for such relief in her pleadings. Thi 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award hold 
ing that the wife's prayer for general relief was suffi. 
cient, and that the facts which she alleged in her com-
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plaint an<l later proved at trial entitled her to the fees 
awarded. 222 P. 2d at 1058. 
In Butler 'l.'. Butler, 23 Utah 2d 259, 461 P. 2d 
7'27 ( 1 H69), also cited by respondent, the trial court 
awanlecl the former wife $600.00 in attorney fees in a 
post divorce action brought by her former husband to 
have her held in contempt for refusing to comply with 
the child custody provisions of the divorce decree. The 
husband a ppealecl claiming that there was no evidence 
in the record to support the court's award. The Supreme 
Court agreed and reversed. 461 P. 2d at 728-29. 
Stuber 'l.'. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 241!! P. 2d 650 
( 1 !);)()) is also completely in accord with the JJT eiss and 
,,J lldrtdgc decisions. In the Stuber case the ex-wife 
brought suit against her ex-husband to force him to 
compl~r with trial court's decree which had awarded the 
custody of the parties' only child to her. The trial court 
affirmed its earlier award and ordered the defendant 
to deliver the child forthwith to the plaintiff. In addi-
tion, the court ordered him to pay his ex-wife an at-
torney's fee in the amount of $100.00. The evidence in 
regards to the attorney's fees showed that the husband's 
net monthly income was almost three times as large as 
the wife's. llased on this evidence the Supreme Court 
affirrnecl the trial court's award, obviously concluding 
that a sufficient showing of need had been made by the 
wife. 244 P. 2d at 653. In the instant case, the respon-
dent's assets and income as awarded by the trial court 
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are almost twice as large as appellant's, and consequent-
ly the ,~'tuber case can hardly be said to be authority for 
the trial court's award in the instant action. 
Finally, the respondent cites Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
14 Utah 2d 24, 376 P. 2d 547 ( 1963), which is, how-
ever, completely irrelevant to the issue raised in this 
appeal. In the Sorensen case the wife was awarded at-
torney's fees in an amount not revealed in the Supreme 
Court's opinion. The husband unsuccessfully appealed 
this award claiming solely that the award was excessive. 
No issue as to the necessity of the award was raised by 
the husband and consequently that case has no prece-
dential value in the instant situation. 
POINT V 
As appellant established in his brief, under this 
Point V, the trial court's actions when viewed as a whole 
manifest an unlawful intent on the court's part to pun· 
ish appellant. Respondent has replied to this hy argu· 
ing that it is legitimate for the court to consider the 
relative degrees of fault of the parties. This is ~ rather 
interesting position for respondent to adopt since it 
seems to impliedly admit that the court's actions were 
in fact punitfre and inequitable. :Moreover, respondent 
has not attempted to reveal how the court's actions could 
be considered to be fair and equitable, and this is not 
surprising since it is clear that they were not. 
Respondent, has also argued the court's award in 
1.5 
the instant case is not punitive because the Supreme 
Court in JVil.Yun v. JVilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 
( l!l5G), affirmed the trial court's award of substantially 
all of the property in the marital estate to the wife. 
What respondent fails to reveal is that the total value 
of the marital estate in that case was only $17,681.65. 
2DG P. 2cl at 978-79. In view of the size of the estate 
arnl the fact that th~ wife established "that she ... [was] 
in poor health; that she ... [had] been under doctor's 
care; that she ... [was] not presently capable of work-
ing ancl ... [had] no special training or skill with which 
to maintain herself," 296 P. 2d at 980, it is not surpris-
ing that this Court affirmed the trial court's division 
of the marital estate. J\Ioreover, it should be noted that 
this Court then went on to reduce the trial court's award 
of alimony by 50%, on the ground that it, when it was 
reviewed in the light of the court's property award, con-
stituted a clear abuse of discretion and was manifestly 
unjust. 296 P. 2d at 980. It is submitted that the trial 
court's awards in the instant case likewise represent a 
clear abuse of discretion and are manifestly unjust to 
appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set 
forth in appellant's brief, it is respectfully requested 
that the Court set aside the property, alimony and at-
torney's fees, awards of the trial court and exercise the 
authority which it has in a divorce action to review the 
record de novo, Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 84, 
16 
206 P. 2d 077 (1n;36); and 1Virse 'I:'. TVic.~c. 24 Utah2d 
236, 238, 46!) P. 2d ;304 ( l H70), hy decreeing its own 
judgment denying respondent alimony and attomey 
fees, ordering the inclusion of respondent's inheritance 
from Dr. Hirth in the marital estate, awarding appel· 
lant $340,Hl 1.00 of that estate which would then be 
Yalued at $656,Hl 1.00 (utilizing $75,000.00 as the value 
of respondent's inheritance from Dr. I-Iirth) and award· 
ing respondent the remai11<ler, which would come to 
$307,000.00. In the alternati,·e, appellant requests that 
the judgment of the district court be re\'erse<l in all 
particulars other than its award of a divorce to respon· 
dent and that the cause he remanded with directions to 
eliminate the awards of alimony and attorney fees, to 
recalculate the value of the marital estate and to dis· 
tribute it in accordance with the directions of this Court. 
DATED this ........ day of ............................ , 1972. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT. BAGLEY, CORN1VALL 
& l\IcCAR'l'II Y 
Clifford L. Ashton 
Ray G .. Martineau 
.AttornclJS for Defendant-Appellant 
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